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UTAH UTAH SUPRt.ME COURT 
DOCUMENT 
KFU BRIEF 
45.9 
~gCKET NO. 3.2Lt 0 A 
No. 3240. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OCTOBER TERM, 1918. 
F. L. BYRON AND CHARLES S. AUSTIN, 
RESPONDENTS, 
vs. 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, A CoRPORATION, 
APPELLANT, 
AND 
JOHN KNUDSON AND GEORGE C. EARL, 
DEFENDANTS, 
AND 
STEPHEN HAYS, IMPLEADED AS AN ADDITIONAL 
DEFENDANT, RESPONDENT. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
Hon. George F. Goodwin, Judge. 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
On August 10, 1915, Stephen Hays was the owner 
and in possession of the locus in quo, a certain tract 
of land comprising about 3.45 acres. (A. 22, 23, 30, 
32, 55, 56.) 
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On that date Stephen Hays and his wife "by quit 
claim deed conveyed said premises to" one Earl. (A. 23, 
30, 32, 56.) The deed from Hays to Earl "conveyed" 
the "property and premises (A. 56) in fee" (A. 39), 
subject however to the following (A. 23, 24, 30, 32, 
39, 56, 57) reservation, to wit: 
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to 
all ores in and underneath the surface area here-
inbefore described, together with the right to 
mine and remove same, provided said mining 
operations of said grantors shall not endanger 
any building or buildings or improvements now 
or hereafter erected on a portion of the surface 
area hereinabove described by reason of sinking 
or caving of the surface of said area caused by 
said mining operations, said portion being de-
scribed as follows, to wit: 
"Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 
degrees 30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. 
corner of the west half of east half of the 
N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence N. 
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence S. 72 
degrees 30 min. East 100 feet, thence S. 17 
degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72 
degrees 30 min. West, 100 feet to beginning. 
"Said grantors also reserve the right to use 
any wagon road which may be constructed in 
the future by said grantees over the 3.45 acres 
of ground firstly described herein." 
In obtaining and taking said deed, Earl was acting 
as the agent of and on behalf of the Utah Copper 
Company. (A. 57.) 
Thereafter and on the same day, said Earl and his 
wife, by quit claim deed, in form identical with that 
of said deed from Hays to Earl, conveyed the premises 
to the Utah Copper Company, which went into the 
possession of the same. (A. 57.) 
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The tract embraced in said proviso, was referred to 
as the "restricted area," and for convenience will be 
so hereinafter referred to. 
The Utah Copper Company, after the making of 
said conveyances, excavated said rectangular strip or 
restricted area for the purpose of erecting buildings 
thereon, and removed the material so excavated to 
other portions of said premises so conveyed, making 
two dumps and supported the same in part by cribbing, 
and used a portion of one dump to support a retaining 
wall constructed by it. (A. 59.) When said rectangu-
lar strip or restricted area had been excavated or 
leveled off, the Utah Copper Company, the appellant, 
erected thereon a retaining wall and constructed five 
substantial houses in a row, three of them being 
situate wholly within the boundaries of said rectangular 
strip or restricted area, one partly within and partly 
without said strip, and one entirely off said strip, and 
also, continued said retaining wall on said premises 
so conveyed beyond the boundaries of said rectangular 
strip or restricted area. (A. 59.) 
After said rectangular strip had been excavated and 
built upon, as aforesaid, and on January 25, 1916 
(A. 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 59, 60), said Hays 
executed and delivered to respondents Byron and Austin, 
an instrument denominated a "mining lease and bond," 
whereby he leased to them as "lessee," for a term of 
two years from that date: 
"All the following described mine and mining prop-
erty," more particularly described as: 
"A parcel of land between Main Bingham 
Canyon and Carr Fork and extending from City 
Water Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) hotel. In 
mining on said land said lessees shall not en-
danger any building on said lands or improve-
ments thereon and shall in all respects abide by 
and conform to the restrictions upon said mining 
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contained in deed recorded on page 327, Book 
7-F of Deeds, Records of Salt Lake County." 
The deed thereby referred to was said deed from Hays 
to Earl. 
By said lease the lessees, covenanted "to commence 
work at once upon said mine, and work the same in a 
good and workmanlike manner" and "to timber said 
mine" and to pay a royalty on "the net value of all 
ore extracted" from said premises, "after deducting the 
cost of transportation" from mine to smelter or sampler. 
And it was also provided that the "lessees may use any 
and all roads on land." 
The lessees began mining operations under said lease. 
They attempted to remove ore contained in the material 
which had been removed by the Utah Copper Company 
from said rectangular strip or restricted area, and 
deposited in said dumps, which were supported by said 
cribbing erected by appellant. In their operations, the 
lessees disturbed said cribbing. Thereupon, appellant, 
and its employes, interfered with their work. (A. 60, 
61.) 
Thereupon said lessees brought this action to enjoin 
interference with their surface operations, and to adjudi-
cate the rights of all the parties, said Hays being 
impleaded as a defendant. 
Since the institution of this action, the Copper Com-
pany has erected another substantial house on said 
premises without said rectangular strip or restricted 
district. (A. 61.) 
The court entered a decree (A. 67 to 71) whereby 
it was ordered and decreed: 
1. That Hays "is the owner of all the ores in and 
underneath the surface area" of the entire tract, "to-
gether with the right to mine and remove such ores 
without supporting the surface in its natural state or 
otherwise, except as to" the rectangular strip or re-
stricted area ; and 
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2. That the lessees have the "right to mine and re-
move any and all ores in and underneath the surface 
area of all said premises," "including the ores in the 
dumps thereon, without supporting the surface or any 
part thereof in its natural state or otherwise, except 
in respect to" said rectangular strip or restricted area. 
Appellant sued out this appeal, and by its motion for 
a new trial (A. 79 to 85) and its assignment of errors 
(A. 90 to 98) asserts and contends that the decree is 
not supported by the pleadings and findings of fact 
herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREMACY OF THE DEEDS FROM HAYS TO EARL, AND 
EARL TO THE UTAH COPPER COMPANY. 
The rights of both the Lessees and Appellant are 
derived from their common grantor, Hays. The title 
of Appellant antedates that of the Lessees, and hence, 
it is not and cannot be controverted but that they took 
subject to the precedent grant, and any right, title or 
privilege conferred thereby on appellant must dominate 
any conflicting right or privilege founded upon the lease 
to them. This is elementary. 
Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242, 21 
Am. R. 55; 
Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. A. 44, 74 
N. E. 1027. 
POINT II. 
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
The Lessees proceed upon the theory and contend 
that: (1) they are entitled under their lease to any 
and all rights reserved by Hays in his deed to Earl; 
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and (2) that under that reservation Hays has the 
right to enter, at any and all times and places, upon 
the surface of this land, and tear up, excavate and work 
the surface thereof, and remove and take away any 
"ore" found "in" the surface. 
That is also the theory of the impleaded defendant 
Hays, as his only complaint is that of a loss of royalties 
under the lease. (A. 30, 31.) 
As we have already seen, the language of the lease 
is materially different from that of the deed. Hence 
the questions presented for solution are: 
(a) What estate passed to Earl by the deed 
from Hays? and 
(b) What estate or rights remained in Hays 
by virtue of the reservation in the deed? and 
(c) What estate or rights reserved to Hays 
passed to the Lessees under the lease? 
POINT III. 
THE ESTATE PASSED BY THE DEED FROM HAYS TO EARL 
WAS MORE THAN A MERE SURFACE RIGHT. IT WAS A 
FEE SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION CONTAINED IN THE 
DEED. 
Originally the en tire fee was vested in Hays. He 
conveyed the ''described tract of land" to Earl. Our 
Statute (Sec. 1970, Com. L. 1907) provides that: 
"The term 'heirs' or other technical words of 
inheritance or succession are not requisite to 
transfer a fee in real estate." 
and Sec. 1971 provides that: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended 
to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it 
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate 
was intended." 
,. 
' 
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And Sec. 1982 prescribes a statutory form of quit-
claim deed and provides that such deed 
"shall have the effect of conveyance of all right, 
title, interest and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein described, and all rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging 
at the date of such conveyance." 
Hays had a fee simple title. He conveyed to Earl, 
not mere "surface rights," but the "described tract of 
land." He is presumed to and did convey the fee simple 
which he had. Hence, appellant has more than mere 
"surface rights." It has the entire fee in the "described 
tract of land" to use for any and all purposes it sees 
fit, subject to the specific reservation in Hays. 
Hendler vs. L. V. Ry., 209 Pa. St. 256, 58 
Atl. 486. 
Ericson vs. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 
161. 
POINT IV. 
AS THE ESTATE VESTED IN APPELLANT, THE GRANTEE OF 
EARL, WAS THE FEE, APPELLANT HAD AND HAS THE 
RIGHT TO BUILD HOUSES OR OTHER STRUCTURES ANY-
WHERE AND EVERYWHERE ON THE PROPERTY IT SEES 
FIT. 
Later on, we will discuss the right of appellant to 
surface support and freedom from interference for any 
structure it may erect upon this land. 
There can be no question but that, as the owner of 
the fee, appellant had and has the right to erect houses 
or other structures on this land, anywhere it sees fit, 
at any time it sees fit. 
The deed from Hays to Earl does not contain any 
building restriction. The court cannot write any such 
limitation into the deed. The deed passed the fee. Hence 
it passed the right to build anywhere the grantee sees 
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fit. The grantee had the same right to build on it 
as Hays had before he deeded it. That is the. legal 
effect of a conveyance of a fee. 
As said by this court in Wright vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 
584, at 589: 
"It is elementary that the parties to the con-
tract must be deemed to have had in mind the 
law in force at the time the contract was entered 
into." 
Appellant had the same right to build a house after 
as before this suit was started. No court has ever 
denied appellant the right to build those houses and 
structures, and under this fee deed no court ever justly 
can or will. 
So in the last analysis, the question in this case is 
how to harmonize that incident of the fee with the 
reservation, and what is the effect of the one upon the 
other? 
The deed contains no restriction on the number or 
limitation on the location of the buildings or other 
structures appellant might place on this land. The 
legal effect of the deed in this respect in passing the 
fee is clear and unambiguous. 
POINT V. 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO WORK ANY SURFACE 
MATERIAL FOR ORES. THEIR MINERAL RIGHTS ARE LIM-
ITED TO ORES BENEATH THE SURFACE. IN ALLOWING 
THEM TO CONFISCATE APPELLANT'S DUMPS AND CUT 
ITS CRIBBING AND INJURE ITS HOUSES, THE DECREE IS 
GROSSLY ERRONEOUS AND UNJUST. 
The decree allows respondents to work and tear up 
Appellant's dump made to support its retaining walls. 
(A. 60, 61, 69.) It gives them the right to cut and 
destroy appellant's cribbing. (A. 60, 61, 69, 70.) It 
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gives them the right to injure and interfere with appel-
lant's houses and structures located off of the rectangu-
lar strip or restricted area. (A. 69, 70.) 
This is grossly unjust and erroneous. 
The language of the reservations in the deed from 
Hays to Earl is as follows: 
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to 
all ores in ,and underneath the surface area here-
inbefore described, together with the right to 
mine and remove same, provided said mining 
operations of said grantors shall not endanger 
any bu.ilding or buildings or improvements now 
or hereafter erected on a portion of the surface 
area hereinabove described by reason of sinking 
or caving of the surface of said area caused by 
said mining operations, said portion being de-
scribed as follows, to wit:. 
"Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 
degrees 30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. 
corner of the west half of east half of the 
N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence N. 
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence S. 72 
degrees 30 min. east 100 feet, thence S. 17 
degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72 
degrees 40 min. west, 100 feet to beginning. 
"Said grantors also reserve the right to use 
any wagon road which may be constructed in 
the future by said grantees over the 3.45 acres of 
ground firstly described herein." 
Respondents contend that the word "in" there has 
the effect of reserving to Hays all ore "in" the surface. 
They must and do concede that if the reservation to 
Hays is limited to ore "underneath the surface," they 
have no right or standing to maintain this action, and 
no right to the absurd result the decree effects. 
To state their contention in their own language, as 
heretofore employed by them, they say that: 
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"It was any ore that might be in this surface 
that was reserved in the grantor; also any that 
was underneath the surface. It might be little, 
it might be a great deal, or it might be none 
whatever, but whatever there was was reserved 
to the grantors, together with the right to mine 
and remove the same, and there was no limitation 
in the way that it should be mined whether by 
open quarrying, or in any other way." 
And so, to use their own language again, they contend 
that Hays 
"could go upon this ground, sink a shaft, or 
take any other means "that were necessary to re-
move the ore," etc., including surface steam 
shovels, blasting, etc." 
Respondents' whole contention revolves around the 
meaning of the work "in" standing alone and by itself. 
Let us see the result or consequence of the doctrine 
contended for by them. Appellant bought not merely 
"surface rights" but the land itself and the fee thereto. 
It paid good money for it. Yet, on their theory appel-
lant has no rights they are bound to respect outside of 
the so-called "restricted area" and very few on it. On 
their theory, they can go anywhere on that land and 
work and dig and experiment and blast and quarry and 
do anything they please regardless of what damage they 
do to buildings or other improvements thereon, and 
regardless of the effect of their doings as increas-
ing the cost of future improvements thereon. On 
their theory, although Hays conveyed a fee title to 
apellant, they recognize, in their own language, "no 
limitation" on what they shall do on said land or how 
they shall do it. On their theory, there is on all this 
land, outside the restricted area, no surface or surface 
rights belonging to appellant which plaintiffs would 
be obligated to consider in their operations. If the 
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word "in" has the meaning which plaintiffs contend 
it has in this reservation in this conveyance, then ap-
pellant paid its good money for property which, on 
their theory, could be of no benefit to apellant should 
they at any time desire to enter upon the premises 
and disturb the surface thereof in exploring for and 
removing what they might consider to be ore. In 
short, Hays did not part with the soil he was paid for 
and which it was the object of the conveyance to ob-
tain. In short, the reservation has nullified the grant 
itself. The integrity of Appellant's estate is destroyed 
to create or preserve the reservation. Thus the reser-
vation not only derogates from, but annihilates the 
grant itself. So, in buying the land, appellant did a 
vain and useless thing. The grant is to be rendered 
nug.atory by the reservation. Such a result is unreason-
able and intolerable, and as said in Wetmore vs. Fiske, 
15 R. I. 354, 5 Atl. 375, at p. 377: 
"The possibility of such a result affords a 
strong presumption that it would not have been 
intended by the parties." 
Such a result cannot be sound. In a court of justice, 
it must be swept away with the scorn it deserves. In 
the language of Judge Caldwell, in Butler vs. McGarrisk 
(C. C. A. 8 Cir.), 114 Fed. 300, at 302, it is unreason-
able to suppose Earl bought land he could not use, and 
"He was guilty of no such absurdity. No court 
would place such a construction on the deed 
unless its language compelled it. The plain lan-
guage of the deed refutes such a construction." 
A reservation which is repugnant to the grant or 
renders it inoperative, is void. 
13 Cyc. 675. 
Brewster Conveyancing, Sec. 126. 
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The court will avoid a construction which entails an 
unreasonable or oppressive result. 
and: 
and: 
McKay vs. Barnett, 21 Utah 239. 
Caine vs. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69. 
"The court will endeavor to give the contract a 
rational and just construction." 
Caine vs. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69, at 81. 
"Courts will incline towards giVmg language a 
reasonable construction and will avoid, if possi-
ble, an absurdity if the language is susceptible 
of some other meaning." 
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, at 167. 
If respondents have the rights they contend for and 
which this decree gives them, what rights has appellant? 
Absolutely none. Its fee is a fiction, a worthless "scrap 
of paper," not a realty. 
Appellant contends that the word "in" as there used, 
simply means within the exterior boundaries of the tract 
conveyed, and that under the reservation Hays could 
only mine for ores underneath the surface. 
Which of these contentions is correct? Let us test 
them by the well-settled rules of construction. Let 
us see which construction gives effect to the obvious 
intention of the parties to the deed as gathered, not 
from any one isolated word, but from the context of the 
entire instrument. Let us see which construction better 
and consistently preserves the integrity of each estate 
created by the severance consequent upon the reserva-
tion. 
If it was the intention of the parties that Hays should 
reserve any such rights "in" the surface, why was it 
necessary for him to make a specific reservation of 
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"the right to u.se any wagon road" on the land? On 
Respondents theory, they could use such road anyway, 
or, if they saw fit, could destroy it in their disturbance 
of the surface. By ·this additional reservation, Hays 
in express terms enumerated the surface privilege he 
was to enjoy. It shows that he intended to convey, as 
he did convey, the entire surface and surface rights 
to Earl as an incident of the fee which passed under 
his deed. 
Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71 
Atl. 845. 
It cannot be assumed that he was uselessly and un-
necessarily making a specific reservation of one specific 
surface privilege, if he already had it by virtue of the 
precedent provisions of the deed. If he could "run 
amuck" all over the place and disturb the surface or do 
with it as he pleased, he was wasting words when he 
wrote the wagon road reservation. 
Hays conveyed the land itself to appellant in fee. 
That embraced and included the surface thereof and 
all surface rights incident to such fee. While he 
reserved the right to mine, he did not expressly reserve, 
or attempt to reserve, the right to disturb the surface 
by his "mining operations." We shall hereafter come 
to the question of appellant's right of subjacent sup-
port. Whether such right is vested in appellant or not, 
certainly this deed never contemplated that Hays should 
disturb the surface otherwise than by "sinking or 
caving" it in the course of his "mining operations." 
As is said in Collins vs. Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 
N. W. 497, at 499: 
"In other words, having sold the surface with-
out expressly or by necessary implication reserv-
ing the right to destroy the whole or a part 
thereof, why should the courts interfere and 
create for him an implied right to destroy such 
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estate, founded only on his most general reser-
vation? It is a general rule that the grantor 
may not do anything to injure the estate granted, 
and we see no reason for grafting onto a con-
veyance or contract of this nature an exception 
thereto." 
The word "in" relates to the word "area." The 
word "area" is (Johnston's English Dictionary) defined 
as 
"the surface contained between any lines or boun-
daries." 
This very definition of an "area" demonstrates that 
this word "in" simply means "within the exterior lines 
or boundaries" of the described tract conveyed. The 
word "surface" does not relate to the word "area." Such 
a construction, gramatically at least, is nonsense. The 
"area" is the "surface." There can be no question but 
that this clause should be construed as reading "ores 
in the area hereinbefore described and underneath the 
surface." Such a construction avoids nonsense in the 
use of language. It avoids the redundancy in the word 
"surface" involved in plaintiffs' contention. And 
"No word in a contract is to be treated as a 
redundancy, if any meaning reasonable and con-
sistent with other parts can be given to it." 
9 Cyc. 583. 
Unless these words are so transposed they are absurd 
and clearly repugnant to the rest of the deed. And 
"If what was intended clearly appears from an 
examination of the entire instrument, * * * 
the words may be transposed and read in their 
proper places in order to give them effect and 
thus carry out the clear intent and purpose even 
though badly expressed." 
13 Cyc. 607. 
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But let us consider the context further. Hays re-
serves "the right to all ores" and in order to get them 
reserves "the right to mine and remove the same pro-
vided that said mining operations" do not do the damage 
specified. These qualifying words attach to the word 
"in .. " 
Presumptively, the parties used the words "mine" 
and "mining oper:ations" in their primary sense. It is 
settled that the primary import of those words is the 
extraction of ore by underground excavation as dis-
tinguished from surface workings. 
Costigan Min. Law, pp. 143, 144; 
1 Lindley on Mines (3 Ed.), Sec. 88. 
So in the recent case of Carroll vs. Bell, 237 Ill. 332, 
86 N. E. 593, it is said: 
"A mine is an excavation in the earth for the 
purpose of obtaining minerals (2 Bouvier's Law 
Diet., Rawle's Ed. 413) an excavation, properly 
underground for the purpose of taking out some 
useful product. (Standard Diet.)" 
That the parties had that meaning and that alone in 
mind, is evidenced by their provisions respecting the 
"sinking or caving of the surface of said area caused 
by said mining operations." 
The words "mining operations" must be given the 
same meaning both times they are used in the one 
sentence. Unquestionably, they refer only to under-
ground operations in the last instance, so they must 
be construed as referring only to underground opera-
tions in the first instance. Obviously, Hays only in-
tended to reserve the "ores" to be extracted by him by 
his underground "mining operations," and not ores un-
earthed by surface disturbances and workings. 
A case much in point is Brady vs. Smith, 181 N. Y. 
178, 73 N. E. 963. There a deed conveyed a tract of 
"1 ! I 
,I 
;I 
:I 
'I 
:I 
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land with the following reservation: "Excepting and 
reserving therefrom unto the parties of the first part, 
their heirs and assigns forever, all mines and minerals 
which may be found on the above piece of land, with 
the right of entering at any time with workmen and 
others to dig and carry the same away." On the land 
there was a ledge of limestone covering some 20 acres 
which cropped out on the surface. It was held that 
the right to quarry and blast such limestone was in 
the grantee and not in the grantors under the reserva-
tion. The court said, at pages 964 and 965: 
"The question presented in the case at bar 
is whether the exception and reservation in ques-
tion is broad enough to include a bed of limestone 
and the open quarrying of the same. So far as 
we are advised, the question presented is open 
in this court. It may be well enough to quote 
once more the reservation to be construed: 'Ex-
cepting and reserving therefrom unto the parties 
of the first part, their heirs and assigns for-
ever, all mines and minerals which may be found 
on the above piece of land, with the right of 
entering at any time with workmen and others 
to dig and carry the same away.' 
"The first point to be observed is that the 
word 'minerals,' as used in this reservation, is 
coupled with 'mines' by the conjunctive--'all 
mines and minerals.' This shows that the gran-
tor had in mind the reservation of mines and 
their contents, to wit, 'minerals.' This is further 
emphasized by the word 'found' -'which may be 
found on the above piece of land.' It appears 
in the findings that immense boulders and ledges 
of limestone crop out on the surface of these 
premises, and it would be a strained and un-
natural construction to assume that the lan-
guage commented upon above refers to stone 
lying open to the view, and that the same may 
be removed by open quarrying and blasting, de-
structive of the surface, under the reservation 
of 'all mines and minerals which may be found.' 
We have here qualifying words quite as persua-
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sive and controlling as those that influenced 
the court in Armstrong vs. Lake Champlain 
Granite Co., supra. 
"The reservation of John LaFarge must be 
read as referring to minerals in mines found, 
with the right to enter at any time with wo.rk-
men and others to dig and carry the same away; 
that is, dug out of the earth by means of mines 
and m1:ning. Darvill vs. Roper, 3 Drewry, 294. 
The word 'dig' has a technical meaning, when 
the context is considered, and does not apply to 
open quarrying and blasting. 
"It is true, under scientific definition, the 
world of matter is divided into three general sub-
divisions-animal, vegetable, and mineral. It is 
equally true that in the ordinary phraseology of 
mankind a 'mineral' is a word limited largely 
to metallic substances. It is quite impossible 
to harmonize all that has been written on this 
subject in the cases and textbooks. In con-
struing reservations and grants it is necessary, 
if possible, to ascertain the intention of the 
parties. In many of the English cases, where 
acts of Parliament were involved, the decision 
went off on the language employed in the various 
acts. There are a number of well-considered 
cases which involve substantially the question 
here presented. 
"In Countess of Listowel vs. Gibbings, 9 Ir. 
C. L. Repts. 223, under a reservation of 'all 
mines and minerals,' it was held that limestone 
was not included in the reservation. The learned 
judge writing in that case said: 'I do not deny 
that, if it appeared clearly to be the intention 
of the parties, to be collected from the instru-
ment, that limestone quarries should pass by 
the words "mines and minerals," they might 
pass; but words are to be understood in their 
natural and usual meaning, unless there be a 
clear indication that they are in a particular 
case intended to have a more or less extended 
signification. Usually, "mine" imports a cavern 
or subterraneous place, containing metals or 
minerals, and not a quarry; and "minerals" mean 
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ordinarily metallic fossil bodies, and not lime-
stone.' 
"In Brown vs. Chadwick, 7 Ir. C. L. Repts. 
101, under a reservation of 'all mines, minerals, 
and other royalties whatsoever,' it was held not 
to include open limestone quarries. The learned 
court said at page 108: "The distinction between 
a mine and a quarry appears to me to be this: 
A mine is a place where the substratum is ex-
cavated, but the surface is unbroken; whereas 
in a quarry the surface is opened, and the ma-
terial, in the present case limestone, is exposed 
and raised.' 
"In Darvill vs. Roper, 3 Drewry, 294, under 
a reservation of 'mines of lead and clay and 
other mines and minerals,' it was held that 
limestone was not included within the reserva-
tion; it was further held that minerals meant 
substances of a mineral character, which could 
only be worked by means of mines, as distin-
guished from quarries." 
So here the "mining operations" of Hays were to be 
"where the substratum is excavated but the surface 
is unbroken." By this construction we find a perfect 
coincidence between the titles or estates of the two 
parties. 
Thus construed, every word in the sentence has 
an appropriate meaning; otherwise, they are uncer-
tain, confusing and, to some extent, meaningless. This 
interpretation is agreeable to the right reserved and 
yet works no unreasonable injustice on anyone. This 
is a salutary mode of construction. This interpretation 
harmonizes all the provisions of the deed and avoids 
any repugnancy between the grant and the reservation. 
The reservation was designed to create distinct in-
terests, not to create conflicting and lapping interests. 
The substratum may legally be severed from the 
surface of the land. But the surface is an inseverable 
part of the land which passes with the fee. An attempt 
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to segregate the surface from the land itself in con-
tradistinction to the underlying substrata would be 
clearly illegal and void. The deed must be given the 
construction which will uphold it, rather than one which 
would cast doubts upon its validity. 
If the appellant did not get the minerals and did 
not get the right to use the surface as any owner of 
a fee may lawfully use it, then it got nothing and 
simply paid its money for a piece of waste paper. That 
would be nothing less than a fraud. Such a construc-
tion is inadmissible. 
9 Cyc. 587. 
If Hays had the right to disturb the surface of this 
ground by quarrying and blasting, etc., to get the 
claimed reserved ore, it is significant that no provi-
sion was inserted in the deed with respect to the dan-
ger to life and property consequent thereon. 
Clearly the "ore" in contemplation of the parties 
was the mineral in situ underlying the surface and 
to be found beneath the bed rock. The parties clearly 
had reference to the "ore" as found in the metalliferous 
rock in place distinct from the surface debris, slide 
alluvium or wash. 
20 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 694. 
Leadville Co. vs. Fitzgerald, 15 Fed. Cas. 
8158. 
Such was the "ore" toward the obtaining of which 
the "mining operations" were to be directed at the 
risk of "sinking" or "caving" the surface without the 
so-called restricted area. 
In Railway Co. vs. Robinson, 15 App. Cas. 28, Lord 
Herschell says: 
"In such agreements, in the absence of a dis-
tinct indication of the contrary intention, it is 
l'i 
I 
'I ,,
il 
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always to be assumed that the reserved mines are 
only to be worked in such manner as is consist-
ent with the surface remaining undisturbed. And 
if this be true of minerals lying deep below the 
surface, it would obviously be out of the question 
to permit it to be disturbed by removing min-
erals which can be wrought by surface opera-
tions." 
We respectfully submit that neither Hays nor his 
lessees has any power, right or authority to enter upon 
the surface of this property conveyed to the Utah 
Copper Company and to remove any part or portion 
thereof; that neither of them has any title whatever 
to any part of the surface material excavated and that 
in attempting to remove the same they are naked 
trespassers. To so construe the deed of conveyance 
from Hays to Earl as to permit the respondents to 
enter upon the premises and remove the material which 
they seek to remove, would be to render nugatory the 
conveyance by Hays to Earl of the premises. This 
conveyance was a conveyance not only of the surface 
but of everything beneath the surface, reserving to the 
grantor the right to mine the minerals underneath 
the surface. This reservation by the grantor in no 
way clothed him with any power or authority to mine 
or remove any minerals which would in any way injure 
or affect the surface of the premises conveyed. He 
is bound in searching for minerals underneath the 
surface and in the removal thereof, to so conduct 
his mining operations that the surface of the premises 
will not be injured, disturbed or destroyed. Otherwise 
the reservation of the right to mine underneath the 
surface of the premises would be in derogation of the 
grant and inoperative and void. Indeed, in mining any 
ores or minerals underneath the surface of the granted 
premises the grantor and his assigns or lessees would 
be compelled to leave so much of the minerals under-
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neath the surface as would be necessary to prevent 
any injury or interference with the surface of the 
premises; and by "surface" in this connection is meant 
all that part and portion of the premises which would 
be disturbed injuriously by mining operations carried 
on in such proximity to such superincumbent surface 
as to cause a change in the character of the surface 
by way of sliding, caving, or otherwise. Surely it can-
not be claimed that either Hays or his lessees would 
have the right under any circumstances to remove any 
part or portion of the surface so as to destroy it or 
to affect it in any way; and the mere fact that the 
defendant Utah Copper Company, in excavating for 
foundation, should remove surface material, even though 
mineral in character, and place the same upon the 
premises owned by it, would not vest title to such 
material in either Hays or his lessees or assigns. It 
will not, we take it, be seriously contended that either 
Hays or his lessees would have the right to enter 
upon the so-called restricted area and remove the 
material therefrom so as to change the surface or inter-
fere with the surface in any way, and if they would 
not have that right and would have no title to any 
such material, it surely cannot be logically contended 
that when the Utah Copper Company, in excavating as 
aforesaid, saw fit to remove loose material and place 
it upon its own property, thereby the title to such 
loose material so removed became vested in either 
Hays or his lessees and clothed them with any power 
to remove the same from the premises of the Utah 
Copper Company. 
Respondents had no right to interfere with any 
improvements of appellant by their surface operations. 
In this respect there is no difference between the build-
ings on and those off of the rectangular strip or re-
stricted area. 
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Respondents, recognizing that no court of conscience 
and justice is going to destroy the grant to Earl and 
appellant, seek to open a door for splitting the differ-
ence by conceding that they have no such right as they 
claim with respect to the restricted area and then 
claiming that there is a difference between it and the 
rest of the tract conveyed to Earl. 
And unfortunately they enticed the lower court into 
making such a differentiation. 
It may be that as respects the obligation of sub-
jacent support for the superadded weight of artificial 
structures, there is a difference between the restricted 
area and the rest of the land. We will come to this 
later. But as respects the question of surface opera-
tions and the destruction of the surface, and surface 
interference with structures, there is no difference. 
If they have a right to remove or destroy or injure 
by blasting a house off the restricted area, or to cut 
the cribbing, why have they not the same right to in-
jure an improvement on the restricted area. In this 
aspect of their claim all of the improvements stand 
on the same footing. 
The deed reserves the "ores in and underneath the 
surface area hereinbefore described," that is, the entire 
tract of land both on and off the restricted area. So 
if their contention is correct, then logically they have 
just as much right to remove material from the re-
stricted area and injure improvements thereon as they 
have on any other part of the entire tract "hereinbefore 
described." 
The proviso restraining the reservation protects the 
building on the restricted area against injury only from 
the "sinking or caving" of them by underground opera-
tion. As respects any other injuries there is no language 
making or justifying any differentiation. 
Hence, if respondents' theory is carried out to its 
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logical result, the whole grant is nullified and the reser-
vation is repugnant to the grant and void. 
The material in the dumps came off of the restricted 
area. The right to build carried with it the right 
to level the ground for that purpose. It is conceded 
that respondents had no right to the ore in the re-
stricted area. The decree gives them no such right. 
Then how did appellant's leveling the ground and de-
positing the material elsewhere pass any title to that 
material to the respondent? If the decree is correct, a 
new way has been invented of evading the statute of 
frauds. 
We have already slwwn that under its fee title appel-
lant can build anywhere on this tract. Certainly if 
appellant has a right to erect buildings on the tract off 
of the restricted area, respondents cannot have the 
right to destroy or injure them. Such an incompat-
ibility is logically and legally inconceivable. 
POINT VI. 
THE DECREE DENIES APPELLANT NOT ONLY THE RIGHT 
OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT FOR ITS ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURES, 
BUILDINGS, ETC., BUT ALSO DENIES APPELLANT THE 
RIGHT OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT FOR THE SOIL IN ITS 
NATURAL STATE. IN THIS RESPECT THE DECREE IS 
GROSSLY ERRONEOUS. 
The decree has this expressed effect. (A. 69, 70.) 
This is in line with and as a result of respondent's 
contention as to the construction of the word "in." 
We submit that in denying appellant the right of 
subjacent support for the surface in its natural state 
the decree is erroneous. 
As said in Wright vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, at 589: 
"It is elementary that the parties to the con-
tract must be deemed to have had in mind the 
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law in force at the time the contract was entered 
into." 
Again it is said that: 
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that that 
which is implied is always as much a part of 
any writing as that which is expressed." 
Cumings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, at 166. 
And again: 
"If the contract by its conditions and legal 
effect invests a party with a right, it is the 
same as if the right had been expressly stipulated 
in the instrument." 
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207-214. 
And again: 
"The parties are presumed, unless the terms 
exclude the presumption, to contract with refer-
ence to the existing laws, and consequently the 
obligations imposed by such law, whether writ-
ten or unwritten, are regarded as a part of the 
contract." 
17 A. & E. Encyc. L. (2nd Ed.), 26. 
The law as to subjacent support is so well settled as 
to be almost elementary, and fully and completely 
sustains appellant's position. 
There is no dissent from the general elementary 
proposition that prima facie and as a matter of common 
right, when the estate in the mineral in situ is severed 
from the estate in the surface, the surface is entitled 
to subjacent support, and the owner of the minerals 
lying underneath the premises granted by him has no 
right to disturb or injuriously affect the surface in 
any way, and must, in mining the minerals underneath 
the surface, leave so much thereof as may be necessary 
to afford support and protection to the surface. And 
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this right to such support and protection is absolute 
and is not dependent upon the degree of care or negli-
gence characterizing the removal of the mineral. 
Walsh vs. Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 137 Pac. 
941· Weav~r vs. Coal Co., 216 Pa. St. 195, 65 
Atl. 545; 
Coal Co. vs. Kearney, 114 Md. 496, 79 Atl. 
1013; 
Steel Co. vs. Sampson, 158 Ala. 590, 48 So. 
493; 
Catron vs. Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9 Cir.), 181 
Fed. 981; 
Coal Co. vs. Bank, 211 Pa. St. 319, 60 Atl. 
924· 
Hoop;r vs. Coal Co., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So. 
652; 
Coal Co. vs. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 
849; 
S. S. 0. & G. Ry. vs. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559, 
34 So. 884; 
Ames vs. Ames, 160 Ill. 599, 43 N. E. 592; 
Lloyd vs. Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460, 71 N. E. 
335· 
S. M. 'Ry. vs. Mining Co., 138 Mo. Ap. 129, 
119 s. w. 982; 
Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242, 21 Am. 
R. 55; 
Carlin vs. Chappel, 101 Pa. St. 348, 47 Am. 
R. 722; 
Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429, 5 Am. R. 
385; 
Mickle vs. Douglas, 75 Io. 78, 39 N. W. 198; 
Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319, 32 Am. R. 
109; 
Lord vs. Iron Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 157, 6 Atl. 
812; 
Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. Ap. 44, 74 N. E. 
1027; 
Berkey vs. Coal Co., 229 Pa. St. 417, 78 Atl. 
1004; 
Costigan's Min. Law, pp. 504, 505; 
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Lindley on Mines (3 Ed.), Sees. 818, 819, 
820, 821; 
Williams vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. Rep. 
242; 
Livingston vs. Coal Co., 49 Ia. 369, 31 Am. 
Rep. 150; 
Ericson vs. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 
161; 
Seitz vs. Coal Co., 149 Ill. Ap. 85; 
Collins vs. Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W. 
497; 
Burgner vs. HumpMey, 41 Oh. St. 340; 
Williams vs. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350; 
Robertson vs. Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566, 33 
Atl. 706; 
Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71 
Atl. 845; 
Paul vs. Coal Co., 44 Ind. Ap. 218, 88 N. E. 
959; 
Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. St. 485, 14 Atl. 
379. 
This proposition is also supported by innumerable 
other cases in the exhaustive and able annotation notes 
to K. C. N. W. R. R. Co. vs. Schwake, 68 L. R. A. 673-
677, and Stilly vs. Pittsburg Co., 41 L. R. A. N. S. 236, 
which notes we commend to the consideration of the 
court. Thus, it is said: 
"It is also well settled that, unless the surface 
owner has by deed or otherwise estopped him-
self from claiming the right, he has a clear right 
to the support of the surface by the vertically 
underlying minerals and other constituent parts 
of the land. The right to vertical or subjacent 
support for the surface in its natural state prima 
facie belongs to every surface owner." 
Costigan Min. Law, pp. 504-505. 
So again it is said: 
"The rule is well settled, when one owning the 
whole fee grants the minerals, reserving the sur-
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face to himself, his grantee is entitled only to so 
much of the minerals as he can get without 
injury to the superincumbent soil (citing cases). 
"And it is held, where a land owner sells 
the surface, reserving to himself the minerals 
with power to get them, he must, if he intends 
to get them in a way which will destroy the sur-
face, frame the reservation in such a way as 
to show clearly that he intended to have that 
power." 
Williams vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, at 468-34 
Am. R. 242. 
And again: 
"If the owner of the entirety is supposed to 
have alienated the surface, reserving the min-
erals, he cannot be presumed to have reserved 
to himself, in derogation of his grant, the power 
of removing all the minerals without leaving a 
support for the surface." 
Humphreys vs. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 731. 
"Whenever a person demises a surface prima 
facie he is intending to uphold the surface in 
order that he may not derogate from his own 
grant." 
Proud vs. Bates, 34 L. J. Ch. N. S. 406. 
In the case of Livingston vs. Moingona Coal Company, 
49 Iowa, 369, 31 Am. R. 150, it is held that a reserva-
tion to the grantor in a deed of the surface of all min-
erals and the right to mine the same 
"by such means as might be deemed proper with-
out thereby incurring in any event whatever any 
liability for injury caused or damage done to 
the surface of the land," 
does not give to the grantors any right to remove 
surface support. 
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In the case of Ericson vs. Michigan Land and Iron Co., 
50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. Rep., p. 161, the opinion was 
written by Judge Campbell and concurred in by Judges 
Graves and Cooley. It is said, in the course of the 
opinion, in dealing with the question of the reserva-
tion of the right to mine minerals underneath the 
surface of granted premises, at page 163: 
"It seems to be the general, and we think the 
better doctrine that a mere reservation of min-
erals, or such a reservation with the right of 
mining, must always respect surface rights of 
support, and will not, standing alone, permit 
the surface to be destroyed without some addi-
tional statutory or contract authority, and that 
such statute or contract authority will be con-
strued carefully to prevent the destruction of 
surface rights." 
See also O'Connor vs. Watson, 79 Penn. State, 242; 
and the case of Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319 (S. C.), 
32 American Reports, 109. 
See also Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio State Re-
ports, 340, 355-6; and Note to Kansas City N. W. R. Co. 
vs. Schwake, 68 L. R. A. 673, 675-6-7. 
Mr. Lindley, in his work on mines (3d Ed.), Sections 
818, 819, 820 and 821, states the rules deducible from 
the authorities and refers in the foot note to a great 
multitude of cases, both English and American, which 
are cited in support of the text. The learned author 
says, in Section 818: 
"The owner of the surface of land from which 
the title to the minerals has been severed has, 
in the absence of a contrary agreement, an 
absolute right to have it supported as it was in 
its original state, and one mining under it is 
answerable for damages arising from failure to 
properly support it, or from negligence in con-
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ducting mining operations, or from both of these 
causes together." 
And again in the same section : 
"A grant or reservation of all and 'every part 
of the mines and minerals in the land' in the 
strongest possible terms would not authorize the 
owner of the minerals to excavate without leav-
ing proper support for the surface. 
"By reasonable intendment the grantee of 
minerals or the grantor of the surface reserving 
the minerals could only be entitled to so much 
of the mines below as would be consistent with 
the proper enjoyment of the surface. 
"This rule obtains without reference to the 
nature of the strata or the difficulty of substi-
tuting artificial for natural supports or the com-
parative value of the surface and mineral." 
Of course, this right of subjacent support may be 
waived by contract. But it exists prima facie and 
the presumption is that it is not waived or intended 
to be waived and the burden is on plaintiffs to show 
the waiver. This is well settled as appears from the 
authorities heretofore and hereinafter cited and dis-
cussed. 
It is equally well settled that such a waiver will not 
be inferred from doubtful language and to give rise to 
such a waiver the language claimed to waive it must 
be clear, unequivocal and so plain as not to admit of 
any reasorULble doubt. This, likewise, is well settled, as 
appears from the authorities heretofore and hereinafter 
discussed. 
Respondents contend that the word "in" constitutes 
a waiver of the right of subjacent support, and base 
their contention on the case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal 
Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 1115. 
In that case plaintiff owned the fee to a tract of land 
containing 68 acres, inlaid with coal. He did not con-
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vey the fee to the defendant, but he conveyed to the 
defendant the coal with the following rights, to wit: 
" * * * 'The party of the second part 
and his assigns is to have the right of way 
through said reservation for a road, air course, 
and drain way, necessary or convenient for 
the mining and removal of said coal and the coal 
under coterminous and neighboring lands, to-
gether with the right to enter upon and under 
said land, and to mine, excavate, and remove all 
of said coal, and remove upon and under said 
land the coal from under adjacent, coterminous, 
and neighboring lands, and also the right to 
enter upon and under the tract of land herein-
before described, and make all necessary struc-
tures, roads, ways, excavations, air shafts, drains, 
drain ways, and openings necessary and con-
venient for the mining and removal of said coal 
and the coal from coterminous and neighboring 
lands to market.' * * * " 
The court held that that particular clause was a 
waiver of the right of subjacent support and in its 
opinion said (pp. 1118-9) : 
"In investigating this subject, the character 
of the transaction should be kept in mind. The 
plaintiff of his own will sold and conveyed this 
coal, with the express privilege of removing all 
of it. The plaintiff knew, when he sold the coal, 
that its removal was contemplated, and con-
sented thereto in language which admits of no 
doubtful meaning. He also knew that, when all 
the coal should be removed, the overlying surface 
would sink unless supported. He, by clear and 
unequivocal language, granted a privilege which 
would necessarily injure him." 
The court recognized that to constitute a waiver the 
language must be express, clear, unequivocal, and 
simply held that the particular language met that 
requirement. 
And the court further said (p. 1121) : 
l 
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"It is conceded that the grantor might waive 
the right to support of the surface, and, where 
that is done, there can be no recovery for injuries 
caused by the subsidence of the soil. It is in-
sisted by the defendant that the language used 
in the deed in controversy is equivalent to a 
waiver. It is true that in this deed there is 
not only a grant of the coal, but also an express 
grant of the right to remove 'all of it.' It may be 
that this grant of the right of removal adds 
nothing to the legal effect of the deed, except to 
make the general grant more emphatic. Taking 
the entire granting clause of the deed together, 
there can be no doubt as to the intention of the 
parties. I rest the case on the fact that plain-
tiff by his deed conveyed the coal with the right 
to remove all of it. There is no limitation to, 
or qualification of, the estate granted, nor is 
there anything in the deed to indicate an in-
tention to limit or restrict the right to remove 
the coal.'' 
Two judges concurred in the majority opinion. Judge 
Poffenbarger wrote an exhaustive and able dissenting 
opinion. He says : 
"I am unable to concur in the view of my 
associates in this case, because I do not think 
it has been or can be, reached without violating 
sound and well-settled principles, and especially 
rules governing the interpretation and construc-
tion of deeds and contracts. The opinion avow-
edly disapproves and repudiates vital principles 
of the law of subjacent and lateral support, de-
clared by every American court that has eve1· 
applied that law to a deed or contract by which 
the surface of land has been separated in title 
from the underlying coal, as well as the decisions 
of the English courts. It expressly condemns, 
by name, the decisions of Alabama, Illinois, In-
diana, Iowa, New York, and Pennsylvania, and 
those of Ohio, and perhaps other states, without 
express reference to them. It demolishes at one 
fell blow the entire system of English and Amer-
ican law on the subject. This the opinion fully and 
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expressly concedes. An effort is made, however, to 
free the case from the operation of the principles 
declared by the numerous decisions thus re-
pudiated and disapproved by this court, but 
uniformly recognized and rigidly enforced by all 
others in the English-speaking world, because of 
an alleged variance in the language of this deed 
from that of the ordinary deed conveying coal 
without the surface. After conveying all the 
coal in the tract of land, except about three 
acres, the deed further stipulates, among other 
things, that 'the party of the second part 
(grantee of the coal) and his assigns is to have 
the right of way through said reservation for 
a road, air course, and tramway necessary or 
convenient for the mining and removal of said 
coal and the coal under coterminous and neigh-
boring lands, together with the right to enter 
upon and under said land, and to mine, excavate, 
and remove all of said coal.' Immediately con-
nected with this there is further language to be 
noticed later. Conceding, for the purposes of 
illustration and argument, that a mere grant 
of all the coal would not confer, by implication, 
the right to deprive the surface of subjacent 
support by removing all the coal, the opinion 
asserts that the clause above quoted confers, by 
express grant, the right to remove every particle 
of the coal, and that the grant of such right of 
removal is an express grant of the right to take 
away the support of the surface, because the 
destruction of the support is the necessary and 
inevitable result of such removal from under 
the surface, provided no artificial support be 
substituted. This is the theory advanced by 
counsel for the defendant in error and adopted 
by the court as a means of escape from the effect 
of the general principles declared by all other 
courts in cases involving the interpretation of 
deeds, severing minerals from the surface by 
grant, or reservation thereof. If it is untenable 
and unwarranted by the language of the deed, 
this decision is squarely contrary to said prin-
ciples, and in legal effect, as well as declaration of 
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opmwn, denies that they obtain in the law of 
this state, although universally approved as 
sound in all other jurisdictions. In determining 
whether this deed may be so distinguished, for 
the reasons aforesaid, it is certainly not improper 
to ascertain what reply other courts have made 
to the same contention, based upon similar, if not 
identical, clauses in deeds of this class. If they 
have held such clause, taken in connection with 
a previous clause granting the coal, insufficient 
to authorize the destruction of support of the 
surface and to distinguish the deed from one 
granting title to the coal without saying more, 
then this decision igno,res and repudiates the 
application of rules of construction and interpre-
tation made by courts of the highest credit and 
repute, and without showing wherein they have 
erred in doing so." 
He then reviews ably the decisions from many other 
jurisdictions and demonstrates the fallacy of the pre-
vailing opinion. He also says (p. 1139) : 
" * * * The court cannot presume that 
by retaining the surface there was any inten-
tion, on the part of the grantor, to retain it other-
wise than in that state in which nature placed 
and left it. If, in his hands, it is to become 
punctured with craters and holes and riven wUh 
fissures, so as to deprive him of the use and 
benefit of it for those p1trposes for which, by 
nature, it is fitted and designed, he does not 
retain the surface in the true arul full sense of 
the word. If, having bargained for the surface, 
he is to be put off with a broken, ruined, and 
useless piece of land, he does not get what he 
bargained for. Hence it will not be presumed, 
in the absence of words expressly showing it, 
that he intended to let the support go from 
under his surface, for the very reason that 
loss of the support is loss of the surface itself, 
and the whole general intent of the contract, 
viewed as a whole, is defeated so far as the 
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grantor is concerned, and thereby the first great 
rule of construction violated." 
And he further says (p. 1139) : 
"The other construction would defeat the gen-
eral intention and subject the whole instrument 
and the general intention to the domination and 
control of the single word 'all,' and without 
necessity, as has been clearly shown. This 
would stand aside the great rule requiring effect 
to be given to the general intent, which is abso-
lute, for the subsidiary rule, requiring effect to 
be given to every word, which is not absolute 
except to the extent that some function must 
be found for each word. It is not absolute as 
to what office it shall perform or the extent to 
which it shall perform or the extent to which 
it shall be effective, and under it the import and 
meaning of mere words are required to be cur-
tailed and limited so as not to conflict with the 
general intent expressed." 
Again he says (pp. 1143-4) : 
"All that has been said thus far in this opinion, 
however, has been put aside by the declaration that 
this deed is free from ambiguity, in consequence 
of which no rules of construction can be in-
voked or applied. The majority opinion, as well 
as the brief for counsel for defendant in error, 
asserts and reiterates that the contract is clear 
and free from ambiguity. I assert that a con-
tract or deed must be read in the light of the 
1·nles of interpretation to ascertain whether it 
is ambiguous. The mental process of analysis 
must be performed in the reading of the con-
tract in obedience to the rules of construction. 
The legal effect of the instrument cannot be 
determined from one clause. All must be read 
and collectively viewed. No words or clauses will 
be limited, or transposed, or otherwise altered, 
from the arrangement in which they are found, 
or the ordinary sense in which they are used, 
unless some conflict is found to exist; but, 
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whether there is such conflict must be deter-
mined from an analysis of all the parts. 'It 
would seem to follow, from the statement just 
made as to the object of interpretation, that, if 
the language of the instrument is plain and 
unambiguous in itself, there is no room for 
interpretation or construction; and it is quite 
frequently so stated. But, in determining whether 
there is such an ambiguity as calls for interpre-
tation, the whole instr~tment is to be considered, 
and not an isolated part thereof; this being 
merely an application of the rule considered be-
low, that the instrument is to be considered as 
a whole.' 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2 Ed., p. 4. 
The first great dominant rule of construction is 
used first to determine whether there is ambi-
guity, ana that rule controls all other rules of 
construction. The assertion made as to lack of 
ambiguity, a mere assumption based upon three 
words of this deed, was made in a case lately 
pending in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, with reference to a contract which that 
court had under consideration. But that court, 
the highest in the land, and at least the equal 
of any other in the world, speaking through 
Mr. Justice White, replied as follows: 'The fal-
lacy which underlies the assertion as to want 
of all ambiguity in the bond arises, therefore, 
from presupposing that, in order to establish 
want of ambiguity in a contract, a few words 
can be segregated from the entire context, and 
that because the words thus set apart are not 
intrinsically ambiguous, thwre is no room fo1· 
construing the contract itself. In other words, 
the confusion of thought consists in failing to 
distinguish between the contract as a whole and 
some of the words found therein. If the errone-
ous theory were the rule, then, in every case, it 
would be impossible to arrive at the meaning of 
a contract, in the event of difference between 
the contracting parties, since each would select 
particular words, upon which they relied, and 
thus frustrate a consideration of the whole agree-
ment. The elementary canon of interpretation 
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is not that particular words may be isolatedly 
considered, but that the whole contract must 
be brought into view and interpreted with refer-
ence to the nature of the obligations between the 
parties, and the intention which they have mani-
fested in forming them.' O'Brien vs. Miller, 168 
U. S. 287, 297, 42 L. Ed. 469, 473, 18 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 140, 144. 'The meaning of the parties to 
written instruments must be ascertained by the 
tenor of the writing, and not by looking at a part 
of it.' Boardman vs. Reed, 6 Pet. 328, 8 L. Ed., 
415. 'When the substantial thing which they 
have in view can be gathered from the whole 
instrument, it will control mere formal pro-
visions, which are intended only as a means of 
attaining the substance.' Chesapeake & 0. Canal 
Co. vs. Hill, 15 Wall, 94, 21 L. Ed. 64. 
"The keynote of the majority opinion is: 
'When a person sells a thing with the right 
to remove it, or the right to occupy and use it, 
he is conclusively presumed, in the absence of 
a contract to the contrary, to have included in 
the consideration not only the value of the thing 
sold, but compensation for the inconvenience 
and injuries which will necessarily result by its 
removal or occupation.' The fallacy of this 
proposition is that it assumes everything at 
issue. It is merely saying in another form and 
in different words that the contract is not 
ambiguous. It assumes that the question of 
the right to remove the coal without leaving 
support has been determined.'' 
We commend this dissenting opinion to the court and 
submit that in itself it is a demonstration that the 
majority opinion is erroneous. 
There are several obvious comments upon and answers 
to the Griffin case. In the first place, it is seen 
that the language of the conveyance in that case is 
different from and much broader than the language 
of the conveyance in the case at bar. 
In the next place, in that case the owner of the 
fee conveyed the coal and kept the surface. In the case 
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at bar the owner conveyed the fee and merely reserved 
the ore. There is a wide difference in the two cases, 
because here we have brought into play another ele-
mentary rule of construction not there applicable, to 
wit: 
"Where the surface owner grants the property, 
reserving to himself the minerals, he cannot 
operate the mine so as to let down the surface 
without specific agreement for such right. The 
presumption in favor of the right to surfar,e 
support is reinforced in this case by the rule 
that a grantor shall not derogate from his own 
grant." 
68 L. R. A. 675. 
This distinction is important. It is recognized and 
applied by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of 
Collins vs. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W. 
497, where the court repudiates the decision in Griffin 
vs. Fairmont Coal Co., and says, at page 499: 
" * * * it is opposed to the rule of our 
own cases cited herein, and we are not prepared 
to overrule them because of the distinction be-
tween this case and the Griffin case, a distinc-
tion which we think may well be made, and one 
that in fact places this case, in principle, in 
line with the Griffin case. Here, the owner of 
the entire estate sold the surface, reserving to 
herself the mineral underlying it, while in the 
Griffin case, the owner of the land sold the 
mineral reserving the surface. The surface here 
was sold for farming purposes, and full con-
sideration was paid therefor. And, in the ab-
sence of anything in the conveyance clearly 
indicating a different intention, it must be pre-
sumed that the grantor intended to convey and 
did convey, the entire use and benefit of said 
surface, and that a general reservation of the 
minerals gave him no right to destroy a part 
of the estate he had conveyed and received pay 
for. In other words, having sold the surface 
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without expressly or by necessary implication 
reserving the right to destroy the whole or a 
part thereof, why should the courts interfere 
and create for him an implied right to destroy 
such estate, founded only on his most general 
reservation? It is a general rule that the grantor 
may not do anything to injure the estate granted, 
and we see no reason for grafting on to a con-
veyance or contract of this nature an exception 
thereto. We are therefore of the opinion that, 
where the owner of the entire estate sells the 
surface, reserving to himself the mineral under-
neath it in general terms, there is an implied 
covenant to so mine as not to materially damage 
the surface." 
The West Virginia case was decided by a divided 
court, and we respectfully submit that the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Poffenbarger is a demonstration that 
the opinion of the court is erroneous. This case has 
not been followed by any other court than the West 
Virginia court and the Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the United States, in which the District of West Vir-
ginia is located. The Court of Appeals, in following 
the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, 
in the case of Kuhn vs. Fairmont Mining Co., 169 
Fed. 191, expressly puts its decision upon the ground 
that the Supreme Court of West Virginia, having de-
cided the given case as it did, there was thereby estab-
lished a rule of property and that it would be dis-
astrous for the state court in the same jurisdiction to 
hold one way and the Federal court another way. The 
Court of Appeals, in its opinion, likewise says that 
the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
is in direct conflict with the decisions of the English 
courts and all other courts of this country. There is 
found in 2d L. R. A. an elaborate note to the Griffin 
case, in which the w.riter of the note takes occasion 
to say that the decision of the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia is in direct conflict with the decisions of every 
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other court in this country, as well as in conflict with 
all the English decisions. 
In 41 L. R. A., N. S., at page 236, will be found a 
very elaborate note to the case of Stilly vs. Pittsburgh-
Buffalo Co., which note is supplementary to the note 
found in 2d L. R. A., supra, and where it is again said 
that the West Virginia decision is in conflict with the 
decisions of all the other state courts, as well as the 
English courts, and is not in accordance with either 
reason or proper construction of deeds of conveyance 
in similar cases. 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Iowa has 
repudiated the Griffin case expressly in Collins vs. 
Gleason Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W. 497. 
So, too, in Paul vs. Coal Co., 44 Ind. A. 218, 98 N. E. 
959, the court rejects the decision in the Griffin case, 
and says of it, at page 961: 
"This opinion is contrary to the general rule 
of implied right." 
In Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. vs. Sampson, 158 
Ala. 590, 48 So. 493, the court says, at p. 494 :. 
"This matter is elaborately and ably discussed 
in the concurring and dissenting opinions in the 
case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 
480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, and 
note. While the majority opinion in that case 
argues very forcibly in support of the proposition 
that, where the owner of the surface has con-
veyed the minerals and expressed no stipulations 
for the support of the surface, the owner of the 
mineral may take it all, without regard to the 
effect of the surface, yet the dissenting opinion 
and the note show that tlvat is against the 
weight of authority, and the majority opinion 
itself admits that, when there is no conveyance 
from the surface owner, he is entitled to have 
the surface supported, and the annotator very 
properly says that the court 'seems to have 
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based its final decision against the existence of 
an implied reservation of support upon the 
particular language of the instrument by which 
the estates were severed.' " 
In Walsh vs. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kas. 310, 137 Pac. 
941, the court holds and says, at pages 942 and 943: 
"It is conceded by the apellees, in substance, 
that as a matter of common right, when the 
estate in minerals in situ is severed from the 
estate in the surface, the owner of the latter 
estate has the right of subfacent support for 
the surface. On the other hand, it is conceded 
by appellant that the right to such support may 
be waived or conveyed by the owner of the 
surface estate to the owner of the mineral 
estate. 
"Appellees cite Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 
59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
1115, in which it is said: 'Where a deed con-
veys the coal under a tract of land, together with 
the right to enter upon and under said land 
and to mine, excavate, and remove all of it, 
there is no implied reservation in such an 
instrument that the grantee must leave enough 
coal to support the surface in its original posi-
tion.' Several other authorities are cited by 
appellees which in some measure tend to sup-
port their contention in the case, but the above 
case seems to be the strongest and most closely 
analogous to the case at bar. That decision, how-
ever, is criticised in an editorwl note, appended, 
in which it is claimed that the rule is not cor-
rectly stated and numerous authorities are col-
lated. That the right to subjacent support to 
the surface will not be deemed to have been 
waived, conveyed by, or lost to the owner of the 
surface, unless such clearly appears, from the 
language used in the conveyance, to have been 
the intention of the parties, is sustained by num-
erous authorities, among which are the follow-
ing cases (citing authorities)": 
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And the court then cites sixteen cases from Pennsyl-
vania, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Alabama, Indiana and New 
York. 
In Piedmont and George's Creek Coal Co. vs. Kearney, 
114 Md. 496, 79 Atl. 1013, the court says at page 1015: 
" * * * The property was conveyed to the 
plaintiff in 1897, 'except, however, all coal and 
other minerals on or underlying said above grant-
ed property to the same extent and in like manner 
as excepted in the said deed from Maria Reese 
et al to Daniel Ritchey and Stewart Arnold above 
described.' In the deed referred to is this reser-
vation: 'The parties of the first part reserve to 
themselves, their heirs and assigns, all coal and 
other minerals that have been or may hereafter 
be found on or in the said lands, together with the 
right to mine and remove the said coal or minerals 
at such place or places as may appear to them, 
the said first parties, their heirs or assigns, most 
suitable and convenient by tram road, plane and 
dump houses or otherwise,' etc." 
The court refused to let the words "on or in the said 
lands" dominate the deed and limited them by the words 
"or underlying," and held that there was no waiver of 
the right of subjacent support. This is a square authority 
in our favor. The same word "in" is used. Here, as 
there, the whole context must be taken, and the word 
"in" must be limited by the words "and underneath." 
The court there says, at pages 1015 and 1016: 
"The general rule of law is that when the estate 
in minerals 'in place,' as they are sometimes 
spoken of in their natural bed, is severed from the 
estate in the surface, the owner of the latter has 
an undoubted right of subjacent support for the 
surface, and the owner of the estate in the min-
erals is entitled to remove only so much of them 
as he can take without injury to the surface, 
unless otherwise authorized by contract or statute. 
There have been some discussions in the books as 
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to the reasons upon which the rule was founded, 
but we have seen no case in which it has been 
unqualifiedly denied. Even in Griffin vs. Fair-
mont Coal Co., 59 W.Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 1115, which has gone as far in sustain-
ing the right of the owner of the minerals to 
remove all of them as any decision we have found, 
the general doctrine is recognized. Without re-
ferring to the English cases upon which the 
original decisions in this country were based, 
the general rule announced above is sustained 
by many of the courts of this country; the 
cases in Pennsylvania, where so much mining 
has been done, being especially numerous. 
Amongst others are Williams vs. Gibson, 84 Ala. 
228, 4 South, 350, 5 Am. St. Rep. 368; Collins-
ville Granite Co. vs. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830, 51 
S. E. 666; Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. 
Rep. 242; Lloyd vs. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460, 
71 N. E. 335; Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319, 
32 Am. Rep. 109; Mickle vs. Douglas, 75 Iowa 
78, 39 N. W. 198; Erickson vs. Michigan Land & 
Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 161; Chicago, 
etc., R. Co. vs. Brandau, 81 Mo. App. 1; Marvin 
vs. Brewster Iron Min. Co., 55 N. Y. 538, 14 
Am. Rep. 322; Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio 
St. 340; Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429, 5 Am. 
Rep. 385; Coleman vs. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81, 21 
Am. Rep. 93; Carlin vs. Chappel, 101 Pa. 350, 
47 Am. Rep. 722; Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 
14 Atl. 379, 6 Am. St. Rep. 719; Pringle vs. 
Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438, 33 Atl. 690; Robert-
son vs. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa. 
566, 33 Atl. 706; Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 
474, 50 Atl. 255, 55 L. R. A. 410, 86 Am. St. 
Rep. 722; Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Alle-
gheny National Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 Atl. 924, 
69 L. R. A. 637; Miles vs. Penn. Coal Co., 217 
Pa. 449, 66 Atl. 764 (annotated in 10 Am. & Eng. 
Ann. Cas. 874). A number of the English cases 
are cited in the notes to Trinidad Asphalt Co. vs. 
A mbard ( 1899), A. C. 594, to be found in 6 Am. 
& Eng. Dec. in Eq. 643, and in some of the cases 
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referred to above, and we will not make further 
reference to them. 
"Although the rule has been so generally 
adopted, the parties can modify it or avoid 
its application by inserting provisions in the 
grants or leases which, expressly or by neces-
sary intendment, relieve the owners of the 
minerals of the duty to furnish subjacent sup-
port, and in many of the cases which have been 
before the courts the question has been whether 
that was done by the particular provisions, and, 
if so, to what extent. We have quoted above 
those which must govern in this case. There 
are many decisions in which provisions very 
similar to these have been held not to be 
sufficient to relieve the owners of the minerals 
of their duty to support the surface. In Mickle 
vs. Douglas, supra, there was a lease with the 
right to mine, 'all the coal'; in Burgner vs. 
Humphrey, supra, there was a grant of 'all the 
mineral, coal, iron ore, limestone, and all other 
minerals,' with the right to enter upon the land 
and search and explore thereon for said minerals, 
coal, etc., 'and when found to exist on said land 
to dig, mine, and remove the same therefrom' ; 
in Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. 242, 21 Am; Rep. 
55, the grant was all the coal, with the right to 
enter on the lands for the purpose of 'mining, 
excavating, and removing said coal'; in Carlin 
vs. Chappel, supra, the deed of the surface re-
served 'all the coal,' with the right of ingress, 
egress and regress, 'for digging, mining, ex-
cavating, and conveying away said coal'; in 
Weaver vs. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 
195, 65 Atl. 545, the grant was for 'all the 
merchantable coal in and underlying all that 
tract of land' for which the right of surface 
support was claimed, excepting five acres under 
the buildings and spring, the usual mining 
rights, were granted, 'with the right to mine 
and carry away all the said coal, and with all 
the mining rights and privileges necessary or 
convenient to such mining and removal of the 
same.' See, also, Dignan vs. Altoona Coal & 
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Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 Atl. 845, 128 Am. St. 
Rep. 812, one of the latest on the subject. In 
those cases it was held that the right of sub-
jacent support was not released in express terms 
or by necessary implication by the words used. 
Many others in accord with that position might 
be cited, but we will only refer to the note in 
Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 2 L. R. A. (N. S.), 
1115, and the note to Miles vs. Penna. Coal Co., 
10 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 874, where many of 
them are collected. The case of Miles vs. Penna. 
Coal Co. is an illustration of how much right 
can be released, while, on the other hand, that 
of Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Hopkins, 
198 Pa. 343, 48 Atl. 19, shows how careful 
that court is to sustain the right, unless it is 
released by express words or necessary implica-
tion. The case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 
supra, is the only one we have found where 
langnage similar to that in the reservation in 
the deed now before us was held to be a release. 
When the doctrine or right of subjacent sup-
port is recognized, as it is with practical unan-
imity by the authorities, it seems to us to be 
far better to require those who desire to enter 
into stipulations by which the one party to the 
transaction is to part with the right which the 
law gives him, and the other is to be relieved of a 
duty which the law imposed upon him, to use lan-
guage that will necessarily import or clearly ex-
press such intention. It should be either by ex-
press words or necessary implication and in our 
judgment the language used in this reservation 
was not sufficient to relieve the appellant of its 
duty to support the surface." 
So, in Beaver vs. Berwind-White Coal Company, 216 
Pa. St. 195, 65 Atl. 545, the court holds and says, at 
pages 546 and 54 7 : 
"This is an action in trespass for failure to 
provide surface support in the mining of coal. 
It was conceded at the trial that the appellee 
had been the owner in fee of the premises on 
which the damages claimed are alleged to haYc 
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been done. He sold and conveyed the coal, 
together with mining rights and privileges, to the 
appellant company. The grant is for 'all the 
merchantable coal in and underlying all that 
tract of land' for which the right of surface 
support is claimed in this action, 'excepting and 
reserving, however, from and out of this con-
veyance five (5) acres of the 'D' bed of coal 
underlying the buildings and spring.' The usual. 
mining rights are granted in the deed, among 
which are the following: 'With the right to 
mine and carry away all the said coal and 
with all the mining rights and privileges neces-
sary or convenient to such mining and removal 
of the same.' The foregoing are the only cove-
nants of the deed with which we have to do in 
defining the rights of the parties to this contro-
versy. It is important to note that the right 
of surface support was not expressly waived, 
and the only question on this branch of the 
case is whether there was anything peculiar in 
the grant, either of the coal, or of the mineral 
rights, and the reservations therein contained, 
to take this case out of the general rule uni-
formly recognized and followed by our courts, 
which provides that the underlying or mineral 
estate owes a servitude of sufficient support 
to the upper or superincumbent strata. This 
rule is settled law in this state and has never 
been departed from. Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa. 
429, 5 Am. Rep. 385; Horner vs. Watson, 79 
Pa. 242, 21 Am. Rep. 55; Coleman vs. Chadwick, 
80 Pa. 81, 21 Am. Rep. 93; Carlin vs. Chappel, 
101 Pa. 348, 47 Am. Rep. 722; Williams vs. Hay, 
120 Pa. 485, 14 Atl. 379, 6 Am. St. Rep. 719; 
Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Hopkins, 198 
Pa. 343, 48 Atl. 19; Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 
474, 50 Atl. 255, 55 L. R. A. 410, 86 Am. St. 
Rep. 722; Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. 
Allegheny National Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 Atl. 
924, 69 L. R. A. 637. The contention of the 
learned counsel for appellant, that the grant of 
'all the merchantable coal' underlying the prem-
ises, together with the necessary mining rights 
46 
to mine and remove the same by necessary im-
plication waives the right of surface support 
under all that part of the tract except such as 
was expressly reserved, cannot prevail in the 
light of the above authorities. It is now too 
late to discuss the policy of the law or the 
wisdom of the rule. The argument is not 
strengthened by the suggestion that, inasmuch 
as the grantor had conveyed all the merchantable 
coal, reserving only five acres of the 'D' seam, 
underlying the buildings and spring, he thereby 
intended to waive surface support to all that 
part of the tract not included in the five-acre 
reservation. If the grantor had conveyed all 
the coal underlying the entire tract without 
any reservation, it must be conceded that the 
owner of the superincumbent strata would be 
entitled to surface support. The fact that he 
cut down the grant, reserving five acres for 
which no compensation was paid and no title 
conveyed, cannot be construed to mean that ap-
pellee is in worse position, in so far as his 
right to surface support is involved, than if the 
five acres had been included in the grant and 
compensation received therefor. It is clear that 
appellee did not, by express grant, nor by neces-
sary implication, nor by any covenant con-
tained in the deed of conveyance, waive the 
right to surface support." 
In Burgner vs. Humphr·ey, 41 Ohio St. 340, the plain-
tiff executed and delivered a deed to the defendant which 
provided that (pp. 341 and 342) : 
" * * * the said party of the first part 
hereby bargains, sells, transfers, aliens and con-
veys unto the said parties of the second part, their 
heirs and assigns, all the mineral coal, iron ore, 
limestone, and all the other minerals, together 
with all the rock or petroleum oils and salines 
in, under or upon the following described tract or 
parcel of land, situate in the township of Norton, 
County of Summit, State of Ohio, bounded and 
described as follows, to-wit: Being the south part 
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of lot 73 in said township bounded south, east and 
west by the lines of said lot, and north by a line 
parallel to the south line of said lot, and far 
enough distant therefrom to contain 110 acres of 
land. Being the same land upon which Burgner 
now resides. And the said party of the first 
part also hereby further gives, grants and conveys 
unto the said parties of the second part, their 
heirs and assigns, as well as their workmen and 
laborers, the right, privilege and license to enter 
upon the above described lands at any and all 
times hereafter, and search and explore ther·eon 
for said mineral coal, iron ore, limestone, clay and 
other minerals, oils and salines, or for any of 
them, and when found to exist on said lands, to 
dig, mine and remove the same therefrom, * * *" 
And (p. 343) the instrument further provided that: 
"It is also agreed that no mining operations by 
the parties of the second part, their heirs or 
assigns, shall extend to or be so near the dwelling 
house or barn now upon said land as to injure 
said buildings." 
In holding that the right of support was not waived 
the court said, at pages 352 to 354: 
"It seems to be well settled, that when one 
owning the whole fee, grants the minerals, re-
serving the surface to himself, his grantee will 
be entitled only to so much of the minerals, as he 
can get without injury to the superincumbent 
soil, unless the language of the instrument clearly 
imports, that it was the intention of the grantor 
to part with the right of subjacent support. 
Humphries vs. Brogden, 1 E. L. & Eq. 241; 
Davis vs. Treharne, 6 Law Rep. 460 (H. L. Ap-
peal Cases, 1881) ; Coleman vs. Chad~uick, 80 Pa. 
St. 81; Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Id. 429; Harris vs. 
Ryding, 5 Mee. & W. 60; Zinc Co. vs. Fmnklin-
ite Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 322, 342; Smart vs. Morton, 
5 Ell. & Bl. 30. The owner has a natural right 
to the use of his land, in the situation in which 
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it was placed by nature, and if the surface of 
the land and the minerals beneath belong to 
different owners, the owner of the surface is 
entitled to have it supported by the underlying 
mineral strata, and, an action may be maintained 
against the owner of the minerals for the dam-
ages sustained by the subsidence. Each owner 
must so use his own, as not to injure the prop-
erty of the other. The subjacent supp01·t should 
be such as will preserve the integrity of the sur-
face; but, if the mineral strata are not essential, 
to prevent the subsidence of the upper soil-if 
the soil above is such as not to require their 
support, the underlying minerals may be en-
tirely removed by their owner, without liability 
to an action for so doing. 
"This obligation to protect the superincumbent 
soil, exists whether there is a conveyance of the 
surface reserving the minerals, or a grant of 
the minerals, without a conveyance of the sur-
face. In either case the presumption arises that 
the owner of the minerals is not, by removing 
them wholly or in part, to injure the owner of 
the soil above. According to the doctrines held 
by the courts, as summarized by an approved 
text writer, the right which the surface has to 
support, is a part of the freehold and not an 
easement. It is a right independent of the 
nature of the strata, and the mine owner can 
only work so far as is consistent with this right, 
and is liable if he violates it. The highest care 
and skill in the working of the mine, is no de-
fense whatever, if injury results to the surface, 
from a removal of the subjacent strata. Woods' 
Law of Nuisance, Sec. 197, and cases cited. 
"If the grantee or lessee of a mineral estate 
desires to be discharged from the servitude of 
leaving a sufficient support to the superin-
cumbent estate, he should secure such relief by 
plain and explicit language in the contract, or the 
contract should contain something from which 
the intention to discharge him from his obli-
gation will appear by necessary intendment. In 
Davis vs. Treharne, supra, it was said by Lord 
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Watson, 'When a proprietor of the surface and 
the subjacent strata grants a lease of the whole 
or part of his minerals to a tenant, I think it is 
an implied term of that contract, that support 
shall be given in the course of working to the 
surface of the land. If it is not intended that 
that right should be reserved, the parties must 
make it very clear upon the face of the contract; 
in other words, they must express theit· inten-
tion so clearly as to enable a court to say that 
such intention is plain.' And in the same case, 
Lord Blackburn said, 'In common right the 
person who owns the surface has a right to 
have it properly supported. A court of law has 
to look at the documents to see whether the 
parties have agreed upon something different 
from the common right. But, whether they have 
done so or not, is a question turning upon the 
construction of the documents.' 
"It becomes, therefore, a subject of inquiry 
whether the language of the contract between 
Burgner and Humphrey et al., when reasonably 
construed, clearly authorized the lessees to re-
move the pillars or supports, though necessary 
to prevent a subsidence of the surface, for, it is 
established beyond dispute, that the ribs and 
pillars were indispensable to the support of the 
soil above, as evidenced by the damage resulting 
from their removal. There is nothing in the 
lease to indicate that Burgner left it optional 
with his lessees, whether they would or not, 
after finishing their mining operations, leave 
the surface of his land in an unfit condition 
for agricultural purposes. In construing the 
instrument, reference should be had to the uses 
to which the property had been applied, and to 
its present and intended use. We do not reach 
the conclusion that because Burgner, by the 
terms of the lease, saw fit to guard his dwell-
ing house and barn from being injured by ex-
tending the mining operations too far, he there-
by gave a license to the lessees to so conduct 
their mining operations as to cause a large por-
tion of his farm to cave in, swag and become 
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wholly useless for plowing 01' cultivation, and 
that, too, without any recompense for the damage 
done, save the royalty on the coal mined and 
removed. That intention to dispense with sub-
jacent support should be manifested by clear 
and unequivocal language in the deed or lease 
is illustrated in the case of Livingston vs. 
Moingona Coal Co., 49 Iowa, 369." 
The court also says, at page 356: 
"The contract of lease under consideration 
contains the clause, 'It is also agreed that no 
mining operations by the parties of the second 
part, their heirs or assigns, shall extend to, or 
be so near, the dwelling house or barn now upon 
said land as to injure said buildings.' In our 
view, this provision exempted the coal under the 
buildings from the mining operations authorized 
by the lease. While it was not permitted to de-
stroy or sink the surface of any portion of the 
farm by failing to leave the necessary supports, 
from an abundance of caution, the land under-
lying the lessor's dwelling house and barn was 
to remain entirely intact. It seems clear that 
the lessor was especially desirous that his dwell-
ing house and barn should not be subjected to 
any of the possible risks of excavation, and he 
therefore sought to protect them against all 
contingencies by inserting the above clause in 
the lease. And the court properly charged the 
jury that having no right to mine there, it was 
of no consequence to ascertain whether the 
lessees did it carelessly and negligently, or 
otherwise; 'that they had no right to mine under 
those two buildings.' " 
The following authorities are to the same effect, 
showing there was no waiver in this case: 
Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71 Atl. 
845; 
Robertson vs. Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566, 33 
Atl. 706; 
51 
Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. St. 485, 14 Atl. 
379; 
Caton vs. Mining Co., 181 Fed. 941 (C. C. A. 
9th Cir.) ; 
S. S. 0. & G. Ry. vs. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559, 
34 So. 884. 
But respondents contend that the provision in the 
deed that the "mining operations" of Hays "shall not 
endanger any building or buildings or imp1'ovements 
now or hereafter erected on the so-called restricted 
area by reason of sinking or caving of the surface, 
caused by said mining operations" is a waiver of the 
right of surface support and protection as to all the 
land outside such so-called restricted area. 
There is nothing in that contention. What was the 
reason for the insertion of that clause? The answer is 
apparent. Unde1· the conveyance defendants had a right 
of support for the entire surface. Howeve1·, that right 
of support and the duty to protect the superincumbent 
soil extended only to the soil in its natural state, and 
did not embrace any duty to support the superadded 
weight of buildings or improvements. 
Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. R. 242; 
Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. A. 44, 74 N. E. 
1027; 
Steel Co. vs. Sampson, 158 Ala. 590, 48 
So. 493; 
Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. St. 474, 50 Atl. 
255; 
C. & A. Ry. vs. Brandan, 81 Mo. A. 1; 
Pullan vs. Stallman, 70 N. J. L. 10, 56 Atl. 
116; 
Gilmore vs. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 23 Am. 
R. 312. 
Appellant desired additional protection and security 
for the integrity of the buildings erected or to be erected 
on the so-called "restricted area." Hence, they thus 
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contracted for it and got it. In other words, it was 
only as to land off the "restricted area" that appel-
lant in erecting buildings thereon took the risk of injury 
to the same if sufficient support was left by Hays to 
sustain the surface in its natural state without the 
superadded weight of the structures. 
But even then, the burden would be upon Hays to 
show that the surface would not have subsided but 
for the superadded weight. 
Thus in Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. Ap. 44, 74 N. E. 
1027, the court holds and says, at p. 1029: 
"It is contended by appellant that it was neces-
sary for appellee Brown to show affirmatively 
that the subsidence of the surface did not occur 
by reason of the weight of the dwelling house 
over the place where the collapse occurred. In 
this proposition appellant is in error, for it has 
been held that the act of a lessee of a coal mine in 
removing all support from the superincumbent 
soil is prima facie the cause of the subsequent 
subsidence thereof, and the burden is on the 
lessee to show that it would not have subsided 
but for the additional weight of buildings erected 
subsequent to the lease. Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 
464, 34 Am. Rep. 242." 
The c1·eation of the so-called "restricted area" ~cas an 
enlargem.ent of the rights of the appellant secured out 
of the abundance of caution, and was a corresponding 
additional obligation imposed on Hays. It was a restric-
tion on the 1·eserved 1·ight and not a waiver of the 
granted right. 
This suggestion of respondents is conclusively an-
swered by the decisions and reasoning in Weaver vs. 
Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. St. 195, 65 Atl. 545, 
and Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340, from which 
cases we have heretofore quoted at length. 
In this case the material of which the respondents 
claim to be the owners, was loose material, and in order 
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for them to remove the same, they necessarily not 
only disturbed the surface but absolutely destroyed 
and removed the same from off the granted premises. 
And in this connection it is a most singular thing that 
the very material which they are now seeking to 
secure to themselves was taken from the so-called 
restricted area, which Hays expressly bound himself 
not to disturb. Under the contention of respondents, 
they could continue removing the surface and destroy-
ing it to indefinite depths so that the purpose for 
which the property was sold by Hays and bought by 
Earl for the Utah Copper Company, could never be 
attained; and thus the so-called reservation of minerals 
would destroy the very grant itself. As we have here-
tofore shown, where the reservation is in der,ogation of 
the grant, the reservation itself is nugatory and void. 
We submit, therefore, that Hays has no such rights 
as plaintiffs here contend for. 
But even if Hays has, the lessees have not. 
POINT VII. 
LESSEES' RIGHTS ARE NOT AS BROAD AS THOSE OF HAYS. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THEIR LEASE IS MATERIALLY DIF-
FERENT FROM THAT OF THE RESERVATION IN THE DEED 
FROM HAYS TO EARL. 
If the lessees are to recover in this action at all, they 
must recover on the strength of their own title, not on 
the title of Hays. The material, and only material ques-
tion in this case is what rights the lessees acquired under 
their lease from Hays. 
The lease demised to them the described "mine and 
mining property" and specifically provided that: 
"In mining on said land said lessees shall not 
endanger any building on said land or improve-
ments thereon and shall in all respects abide by 
and conform to the restrictions upon said mining 
contained in" 
the deed from Hays to Earl. 
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And by said lease the plaintiffs, the lessees, cove-
nanted "to commence work at once upon said mine, and 
work the same" and "to timber said mine," etc. 
The very form of this lease shows that Hays never 
intended to reserve any rights except for undergr.ound 
rnmmg. It also shows that Hays and his lessees recog-
nized the surface rights of appellant, because before 
this lease was executed a building and other improve-
ments had been erected on the land outside of the so-
called "restricted area," and accordingly Hays bound 
the plaintiffs and they obligated themselves not only 
to conform to the restrictions in the reservation as to 
the "restricted area," but also-"a.nd" is the word in the 
lease-not to endanger any building or improvement 
anywhere on "said land." What "said land?" The 
entire tract demised, to wit: 
"A parcel of land between Main Bingham Can-
yon and Carr Fork and extending from City 
Water Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) Hotel." 
The famous words "in" and "surface," etc., are not 
included in the granting clauses of this lease. 
This change in phraseology is significant. The dis-
tinction in the effect, as well as in the terms of the two 
instruments, is too clear to admit of controversy. 
Whatever rights Hays did or did not have to ore "in" 
the "surface," the lessees have none. All that they got 
under this lease was a right to carry on unde1·ground 
mining operations to extract the ore beneath the surface, 
and then only on condition that they preserve the in-
tegrity of the surface both on and off the "restricted 
area." 
This is clear under the authorities hereinbefore dis-
cussed, to wit: 
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Costigan Mining La.w, pp. 143-144; 
III Lindley on Mines, Sec. 88; 
Carroll vs. Bell, 237 Ill. 332, 86 N. E. 593; 
Brady vs. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N. E. 963; 
Railway vs. Robinson, 15 App. Cas. 27. 
POINT VIII. 
EXTRINSIC FACTS AND EXTRANEOUS PAROL EVIDENCE 
CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO VARY THE MEANING OF THE 
LANGUAGE OF THAT DEED OR LEASE. 
On extrinsic parol evidence the court finds that 
(A 57, 58): 
1. The premises conveyed were known to be valuable 
for ores; and that ore of a marketable and commercial 
value had been found at places at and immediately 
underneath the surface; and that surface as well as 
underground methods had theretofore been employed; 
that in the vicinity surface methods were generally 
employed, as at the mines of the Utah Copper Company; 
and that surface methods are the practical and econom-
ical ones in reaching ores immediately underneath the 
surface; and 
2. That at the time of the conveyance it was the 
intention d Hays and Earl that the grantee relinquished 
and waived a right of subjacent support except as to 
the restricted area. 
Now let us consider what this extraneous evidence 
can possibly have to do with the construction of an 
unambiguous instrument. 
If the Utah Copper Company, or anyone else, owns 
lands in fee, and mines them by blasting and steam 
shovels from the surface, is that any justification or 
reason for applying that situation where the fee and 
the minerals are segregated? Is that any reason for 
allowing a reservation to destroy a grant? A custom, 
for a fee owner to mine from the surface can have no 
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application where there is a severance of tne two 
estates, surface and mineral, vested in different parties. 
Such a custom would be unreasonable and void, and 
would also be void because repugnant to the terms of the 
grant itself. See authorities heretofore cited, and also: 
3 Wash. Real Prop., (6 Ed.), Sec. 2354. 
3 Encyc. Ev., 957. 
17 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 18. 
Such a custom cannot be considered in the light of the 
words "sinking and caving" employed in that deed. 
The actual or secret intention of Hays or Earl, or 
both of them, cannot change the deed. 
As is said in 8 Ruling Case Law, 1040: 
"The object is to ascertain the intention of the 
grantor as expressed by the language used, and 
not the unexpressed purpose which may at the 
time have existed in his mind, the question being 
not what the parties m.eant to say, but the 
meaning of what they did say." 
So also it is said: 
"It must not be supposed, however, that an 
an attempt is made to ascertain the actual mental 
processes of the parties to a particular contract. 
The law presumes that the parties understood 
the import of their contract and that they had the 
intention which its terms manifest." (6 R. C. L. 
835.) 
And again: 
"The object to be attained in construing a con-
tract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of 
the parties as expressed in the language used." 
(6 R. C. L. 836.) 
Again: 
"The existing statutes and the settled law of 
the land at the time a contract is made become 
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a part of it, and must be read into it." ( 6 R. 
C. L. 855.) 
Again: 
"When words have a general well-defined 
signification and cannot be considered as tech-
nical or as being peculiar to any business or trade, 
they are to be taken in their plain, ordinary and 
popular sense, for to give evidence requiring 
words to receive an abnormal meaning is to 
contradict the writing; and it is settled that the 
normal meaning of language in a written in-
strument can no more be changed by construction 
than it can be contradicted directly by an 
avowedly inconsistent agreement, on the strength 
of the thought of the parties at the time when 
the instrument was signed, for if that sort of 
evidence was admitted every written document 
would be at the mercy of witnesses who might 
be called to swear to anything." (21 A. & E. 
Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 1106-1107.) 
In 2 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 304, it is said: 
"Extrinsic evidence is received, not for the 
purpose of importing into the writing an inten-
tion not expressed therein, but simply with the 
view of elucidating the meaning of the words 
employed; and, in its admission, the line which 
separates evidence which aids, the interpretation 
of what is in the instrument from direct evidence 
of intentions independent of the instrument must 
be kept steadily in view, the duty of the court 
being to declare the meaning of what is written 
in the instrument, not of what was intended to 
be written." 
In Farmers L. & T. Co. vs. Commercial Bank, 15 Wis. 
465, it is well said at page 480: 
"There is no doubt but that the intention is the 
object to be sought for in construction. And to 
get at that, the situation of the parties and the 
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nature and object of their transactions may be 
looked at. But it must be borne in mind that 
it is not the business of construction to look out-
side .of the instrument to get at the intention of 
the parties, and then carry out that intention 
whether the instrument contains language suf-
ficient to express it or not; but the sole duty of 
construction is to find out what was meant by the 
language of the instrument. And this language 
must be sufficient, when looked at in the light 
of such facts as the court is entitled to consider, 
to sustain whatever effect is given to the instru-
ment." 
Again it is said: 
"But it must be borne in mind that, although 
declarations of the parties may in some cases be 
received to explain contracts or words of doubtful 
meaning, yet no other words can be added to or 
substituted for those in writing. The courts are 
not at liberty to speculate as to the general inten-
tion of the parties, but are charged with the duty 
of ascertaining the meaning of the written lan-
guage. * * * The court cannot give effect 
to any intention which is not expressed by the 
language of the instrument, when examined in 
the light of the facts that are properly before the 
court. For still stronger reason, such evidence 
cannot be received to contradict the clear settled 
meaning of the contract." (Jones Ev., Sec. 454.) 
The legal effect of the deed in passing a fee is clear 
and unambiguous. The language of the reservation is 
clear and unequivocal, and its meaning is settled under 
the law. Parol evidence, or extrinsic facts, or ex-
traneous findings, cannot affect the obvious meaning 
and legal effect of that deed. 
Box Co. vs. Orchard Co., 39 Utah 325. 
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 167. 
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 214, 215. 
As said in Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, at 215: 
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"If the words are clear and unambiguous, 
a contra.ry intention may not be derived from the 
circumstances." 
So the rule is: 
"All conversations and parol agreements be-
tween the parties prior to the written agreement 
are so merged therein that they cannot be given 
in evidence for the purpose of changing the con-
tract or showing an intention or understanding 
different from that expressed in the written 
agreement." (Jones Ev., Sec. 434.) 
And: 
So: 
"Such evidence cannot be received to cont1·a-
dict the clewr settled meaning of the contract." 
(Jones Ev., Sec. 454.) 
"Extraneous circumstances are not resorted to 
for the purpose of controlling the writing and 
engrafting a new one on such proof." ( 1 Encyc. 
Ev., 832.) 
And: 
"Parol evidence is not admissible to show that 
the actual or secret intent of the parties thereto 
was other than is expressed in the writing." 
(9 Encyc. Ev., 329.) 
Again: 
"The rule excluding parol evidence is appli-
cable not only to the terms of the instrument, 
but also excludes such evidence where it will 
opera.te to contradict or vary the legal effect 
thereof. If the instrument as executed by the 
parties is clear and unambiguous in its mean-
ing and has a well settled legal construction or 
effect, such construction or effect will con-
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trol, and is not subject to contradiction by 
parol evidence." (9 Encyc. Ev., 333-334.) 
Also: 
"Where the language of an instrument is un-
ambiguous, it cannot be varied by parol evidence 
of an understanding which is inconsistent there-
with." (9 Encyc. Ev., 378-379.) 
Parol evidence is not admissible to show 
"that the intention of the parties is other than is 
expressed in the language used." (9 Encyc. Ev., 
397.) 
"Where a deed is complete and unambiguous, 
parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict, vary, 
alter, enlarge, or restrict its terms, or to vary 
the operation and effect of the covenants con-
tained therein." (9 Encyc. Ev., 432-434.) 
"Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to change 
the meaning of a word having a general well-
defined signification." (10 R. C. L., 1074.) 
"When the language employed in a contract 
has an ordinary meaning, or if the meaning is 
plain and unambiguous when read in connection 
with other provisions of the contract, extrinsic 
evidence as to its meaning is not admissible." 
(10 R. C. L., 1063.) 
"If every written contract were held subject 
to enlargement, or other alteration, according 
to the testimony which might be offered on one 
side or the other as to previous intention, or 
collateral facts, it would obviously be of no use 
to reduce a contract to writing, or to attempt to 
give it certainty and fixedness in any way." (2 
Parsons Contracts (7 Ed.), 679.) 
"Where the langWLge of an instrument has a 
settled legal meaning, its construction is not 
open to evidence." (2 PaTsons Contracts (7 Ed.), 
683.) 
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"The intention must be ascertained from the 
language of thr: deed itself where that is not 
ambiguous." (8 R. C. L., 1039.) 
"Where a reservation is made, the terms of 
the deed must control in ascertaining the inten-
tion of the parties." (9 Encyc. Ev., 437, 438.) 
"Suppose, again, that the words are intelligi-
ble, but capable, upon their face, of two con-
structions, and parol testimony is admitted to 
settle which meaning shall be taken, is it not 
clear that it is the testimony admitted which 
produces the effect, and not the language of the 
instrument?" (Branns vs. Stearns, 1 Ore. 368.) 
"If the expressed meaning is plain on the 
face of the instrument, it will control." (13 
Cyc., 604.) 
"Whatever the law implies from a contract 
in writing is as much a part of the contract as 
that which is therein expressed, and if the con-
tract, with what the law implies, is clear, defin-
ite, and complete, it cannot be added to, varied 
or contradicted, by extrinsic evidence." ( 10 
R. C. L., 1046-1047.) 
"In the application of the rule above stated 
it must be borne in mind that the law raises 
certain implications from the terms used in the 
contract, and that whatever the law thus im-
plies is as much a part of the contract as that 
which is expressed in terms; and if the contract 
as expressed, or as viewed in the light of what 
the law thus implies from the language used is 
clear, definite and complete, the rule applies 
that it cannot be added to, varied or contradicted, 
by extrimic evidence in its legal import any 
more than in its expressed terms." (21 A. & E. 
Encyc. L. (2d Ed.), 1084.) 
"The language of a written contract complete 
in itself and which when viewed as an entirety 
is unambiguous is, while it is in force, the 
only legitimate evidence of what the parties 
intended and understood by it. In such case the 
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intention of the parties is to be gathered from 
the words used." (2 Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 
1570.) 
So the same author, in discussing the subject of 
mortgages, says : 
"To arrive at this intention the situation of 
the parties and the nature and object of their 
transaction may be inquired into. But it is not 
the business of construction to look outside the 
instrument for the intention of the parties, and 
then carry out that intention when the instru-
ment contains language sufficient to express 
it; the sole duty of construction is to find out 
what was meant by the language of the instru-
ment. (5 Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 4639.) 
"The term 'Construction' implies an uncer-
tainty as to the meaning of the contract, for 
when the meaning is clear and unambiguous 
there is nothing to be construed. Moreover, 
when the language employed is unequivocal, al-
though the parties may have failed to express 
their real intention, the legal effect of the in-
strument will usually be enforced as written. 
When the meaning is plain, another meaning 
cannot be added by implication or intendment." 
(Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 1506.) 
POINT IX. 
THE DECREE SHOULD BE REVERSED. APPELLANT SHOULD 
BE PROTECTED IN THE PROPER ENJOYMENT OF ITS 
FEE. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
L. F. ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
